We study the core of a non-atomic game v which is uniformly continuous with respect to the DNA-topology and continuous at the grand coalition. Such a game has a unique DNA-continuous extension v on the space B 1 of ideal sets. We show that if the extension v is concave then the core of the game v is non-empty i¨v is homogeneous of degree one along the diagonal of B 1 . We use this result to obtain representation theorems for the core of a nonatomic game of the form v f m where m is a ®nite dimensional vector of measures and f is a concave function. We also apply our results to some nonatomic games which occur in economic applications.
Introduction
One of the fundamental game theoretic concepts is the core of a coalitional game. It is the set of all feasible outcomes that no player or group of participants can improve upon by acting for themselves. The core of coalitional games with a ®nite or in®nite set of players was investigated in many works (for a comprehensive survey see Kannai (1992) ). In this work we consider non-atomic games which are uniformly continuous with respect to the discrete NA-topology and continuous at the grand coalition. Any such game has a unique extension which is continuous with respect to the discrete NA-topology on the space of ideal sets. We study the core of the class of such games whose extension is concave on the space of ideal sets. This class includes, for example, every game of the form v f m where m is a ®nite dimensional vector of non-atomic measures on a measurable space TY and f is a continuous function at mT and concave on the range of m. Such games occur in several economic applications. For example, every non-atomic glove market game and every non-atomic linear production game of Billera and Raanan (1981) are of this form and so is any Aumann-Shapley-Shubik market game of an atomless economy with a ®nite number of types (see Section 5) . Large production games with a production function which satis®es decreasing returns to scale are also in this class (they have the form f m where m represents the distribution of production factors among the owners and f is the production function).
We prove that a game in the above-mentioned class has a non-empty core i¨its (unique) extension to the space of ideal sets is homogeneous of degree one along the diagonal of the space B 1 of ideal sets (see Theorem A). The game is totally balanced (i.e., every subgame has a non-empty core) i¨its extension is homogeneous of degree one on all B 1 (see Theorem B). As a consequence we obtain that such a game is balanced i¨it is superadditive with respect to the grand coalition and it is totally balanced i¨it is superadditive (see Corollaries 3.4 and 3.5). We also prove representation theorems for the core of a game of the form v f m where m is a ®nite dimensional vector of non-atomic measures and f is a concave function on the range of m. The theorems are stated in terms of the supergradients of the function f (see Theorems C and D).
In the last section of the paper (see Section 5) we apply our main results to some non-atomic games which occur in economic applications.
Preliminaries
In this section we de®ne some basic notions which are relevant to our work and prove some preliminary results which we use in the sequel.
Let TY be a measurable space, i.e., T is a set and is a s-®eld of subsets of T. We refer to the members of T as players and to those of as coalitions. A coalitional game, or simply a game on TY , is a function v X 3 R with vq 0. A game v on TY is continuous at S e if for all sequences fS n g y n 1 of coalitions such that S n1 s S n and T y n 1 S n S, and all sequences fS n g y n 1 of coalitions such that S n1 r S n and U y n 1 S n S, we have vS n 3 vS.
A payo¨measure in a game v is a bounded ®nitely additive measure l X 3 R which satis®es lT vT . The core of a game v, denoted by Corev, is the set of all payo¨measures l such that lS vS for all S e . As observed by Schmeidler (see the ®rst part of the proof of Theorem 3.2 in Schmeilder (1972)), if v is a continuous game at T, then every member of Corev is countably additive.
The Banach space of all bounded Borel measurable functions with the supremum norm will be denoted by B BTY and by ba baTY , we denote the Banach space of all bounded ®nitely additive measures on TY with the variation norm. It is well known that ba is the norm dual of B. The subspace of ba which consists of all bounded countably additive non-atomic measures on TY is denoted by NA NATY . The NA-topology on B is the weakest topology such that for each l e NA the function f 3 T f dl is continuous on B. The DNA-topology on B (see Mertens (1980) ) is de®ned in the same way, but when the real line R is taken with the discrete topology. Note that a basis for the neighborhoods of f e B in the DNA-topology consists of sets of the form fg e B j mg m f g, where m is a ®nite dimensional vector of measures in NA (if m m 1 Y F F F Y m m is a vector of measures in NA and f e B then m f stands for
In the rest of the paper we denote by B 1 B 1 TY the set of all functions f in B such that 0 f 1. If v is a game on TY a function w on B 1 is an extension of v if w1 S vS for every S e (where here, and in the sequel, if S e then 1 S denotes its indicator function). A game v is DNA-uniformly continuous on TY if for every e b 0 there exists a ®nite dimensional vector m of measures in NA such that for every S 1 and S 2 in we have mS 1 mS 2 A jvS 1 À vS 2 j`eX By Lyapunov's theorem, the indicator functions of the coalitions in are dense in B 1 with respect to the DNA-topology (see also Corollary 22.3 in Aumann and Shapley (1974) ). Therefore every DNA-uniformly continuous game v has a unique extension v X B 1 3 R such that v is DNA-continuous on B 1 (the proof is similar to that of Theorem G in Aumann and Shapley (1974) ). It is clear that v is non-negative on B 1 .
We note that if v g m where m is a ®nite dimensional vector of measures in NA and g is a function de®ned on the range of m then v f gm f for every f P B 1 .
A coalition S 0 e is null in a game v on TY , if for every S e such that S S 0 q we have vS S 0 vS. Let m be a countably additive measure in ba (where here, and in the sequel, if A is a subset of an ordered vector space we denote by A the set of all non-negative members of A). A game v is weakly absolutely continuous with respect to m if every null set of m is a null set of v.
Proposition 2.1. Let v be DNA-uniformly continuous game on TY . Then there exists a measure m in NA such that v is weakly absolutely continuous with respect to m.
Proof:
Since v is DNA-uniformly continuous on TY , for every natural number n there exists a vector m n m n 1 Y F F F Y m n mn of measures in NA such that km n T k 1 and for every S 1 Y S 2 e m n S 1 m n S 2 A jvS 1 À vS 2 j`1 n X For every n let l n 1am n m n i 1 m n i and let m y n 1 2 n l n . Then m e NA . Now let S 0 be a null coalition of m. Then m n S 0 0 for every n. Let S e such that S S 0 q. Then for every n we have jvS S 0 À vSj`1an, and thus S 0 is a null coalition of v. Therefore v is weakly absolutely continuous with respect to m.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 2.2. Let v be a DNA-uniformly continuous game on TY which is continuous at T. Then every member of the core of v is in NA .
Proof: Let l e Corev. Then it is clear that l is non-negative. As mentioned earlier, the continuity of v at T implies that l is countably additive. Now by Proposition 2.1, there exists m e NA such that v is weakly absolutely continuous with respect to m. We show that l is absolutely continuous with respect to m. Indeed, let S e such that mS 0. As l e Corev we have 0 lS lT À lT nS vT À vT nS 0
Hence, lS 0. Therefore l is absolutely continuous with respect to m. We will show that l e NA . Assume, on the contrary, that A is an atom of l.
Then lA b 0. Let 0`e`lA. Since l is absolutely continuous with respect to m, there exists d b 0 such that for every S e
mS`d A lS`eX
Let n be a natural number such that nd b mA. Since m e NA , there exists a partition A 1 Y F F F Y A n of A such that for every 1 i n we have A i e and mA i 1anmA`d. As A is an atom of l, there exists 1 i n such that lA lA i `e, which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Existence of the core
In this section we investigate the existence of the core of a game v which is DNA-uniformly continuous on TY and its extension v to B 1 is concave. We start with a theorem which gives a necessary and su½cient condition for non-emptiness of the core of such a game.
Theorem A. Let v be a DNA-uniformly continuous game on TY which is continuous at T. Assume that its extension v is concave on B 1 . Then the core of the game v is non-empty i¨v is homogeneous of degree one along the diagonal of B 1 . That is, v1 T v1 T for every 0 1.
For the proof of Theorem A we need some preparation. We start with the following proposition which is interesting on its own.
Let v be a DNA-uniformly continuous game which is continuous at T. Assume that Corev H q. Then for every 0 1 we have v1 T v1 T Proof: Assume, on the contrary, that there exists 0``1 such that v1 T b v1 T . Let e v1 T À vT and let l e Corev. Then by Proposition 2.2, l e NA . Since v is DNA continuous at 1 T , there exists a ®nite dimensional vector m of measures in NA such that for every f e B 1 m f mT A jv f À v1 T j`e Now by Lyapunov's theorem, there exists S e such that mS mT and lS lT . Since l e Corev, we have
Let F be a real valued function de®ned on a subset K of a topological vector space X. A liner functional on X is a supergradient of F at a point
The set of all supergradients of F at x 0 is denoted by qF x 0 . It is well known that if K is a convex set and F is a concave function on K and x 0 is a point in the relative interior of K (x 0 is in the relative interior of K if for every x e K nfx 0 g there exist y e K and 0``1 such that x 0 x 1 À y) then qF x 0 H q (see, for example, the theorem on p. 23 of Holmes (1975) ).
Proof of Theorem
We now show that if v is homogeneous of degree one along the diagonal of B 1 , then Corev H q.
For every natural number n b 1 we have 1 À 1an1 T e int B 1 and thus, qv1 À 1an1 T H q. For every n let n e qv1 À 1an1 T . Then
Hence, n 1 T vT and thus n 1 T vT . Now for every g e B 1 we have
As v 0, n is a positive linear functional on B (i.e., n g 0 for every g e B ). Therefore for every n k n k n 1 T vT X Thus, the sequence n y n 2 is a uniformly bounded sequence of continuous linear functionals on B. Let be a weak*-cluster point of the sequence n y n 2 . Then 1 T vT . We show that e qv1 T . Assume, on the contrary, that f qv1 T . Then there exists f e B 1 such that
Hence, n f ` f e v f , which contradicts (3.1). For every S e let lS 1 S . Then l e ba and lT vT . Since e qv1 T , for every S e we have vS vT 1 S À 1 T lSX Thus, l e Corev.
If m is a ®nite dimensional vector of measures in NA we denote by Rm the range of m.
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem A. Let S e . Denote S fQ e j Q r Sg. Then S is a s-®eld of subsets of S. Let v be a game on TY , and let S e . The subgame of v which is determined by S is the game v S on SY S which is given by v S Q vQ for every Q e S . A game v on TY is called totally balanced if for every S e we have Corev S H q.
Theorem B. Let v be a DNA-uniformly continuous game. Assume that v is continuous at every coalition in and that v is concave on B 1 . Then v is totally balanced i¨v is homogeneous of degree one on B 1 . That is, for every 0 1 and f e B 1 we have v f v f .
Proof: Assume that v is totally balanced. Let S e . Since Corev S H q and v S is continuous at S, by applying Theorem A to the game v S on SY S , we obtain that v1 S v S 1 S v S 1 S v1 S for every 0 1. Since the indicator functions are DNA-dense in B 1 , we obtain that v f v f for every f e B 1 and 0 1.
Assume now that v is homogeneous of degree one on B 1 . Let S e . Then v1 S vS for every 0 1. As v is continuous at every coalition in , we can apply Theorem A to the game v S on the space SY S and deduce that Corev S H q.
Q.E.D. In light of Corollaries 3.2 and 3.3 it will be useful to give an example of a function f which is de®ned on the range R of a vector of non-atomic measures on a measurable space and such that f is continuous, non-decreasing and concave on R, f 0 0, f is homogeneous of degree one along the diagonal of R, but f is not homogeneous of degree one in the entire range R. Indeed, let R be the unit square in R 2 (R is, for example, the range of the vector l 1 Y l 2 when the measureable space is [0, 2] with its Borel subsets, l 1 is the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1] and l 2 is the Lebesgue measure on [1, 2] ). De®ne a function f on R by f xY y xy p 1 À ex À y 2 Y where 0`e`10 7 . It is clear that f is continuous on R and homogeneous of degree one along the diagonal of R but not in all R. It is also easy to check (by computing the partial derivatives) that f is non-decreasing. A direct computation gives that the Hessian of f is negative semide®nite on R. Therefore f is concave on R.
A game v on TY is superadditive with respect to a coalition S e if for every two disjoint coalitions S 1 Y S 2 e such that S 1 S 2 S we have vS vS 1 vS 2 . A game v is superadditive if it is superadditive with respect to any coalition in .
The following two corollaries are consequences of Theorems A and B respectively.
Let v be a DNA-uniformly continuous game on TY which is continuous at T. Assume that its extension v is concave on B 1 . Then the core of the game v is non-empty i¨v is superadditive with respect to the grand coalition.
Proof: It is easy to see that if Corev H q then v is superadditive with respect to the grand coalition. Assume that v is superadditive with respect to the grand coalition. We will show that Corev H q. Let 0 1. By theorem A, it is su½cient to show that v1 T v1 T . Since v is concave on B 1 , we have v1 T v1 T . So it remains to show that v1 T v1 T . We ®rst show that v1 T v1 T v1 À 1 T X 3X2
Assume, on the contrary, that (3.2) is not satis®ed. Let e v1 T v1 À 1 T À v1 T . Then e b 0. Since v is continuous at 
Representation theorems for the core
In this section we state and prove some representation theorems for the core of a subclass of the class of games which were studied in Section 3. We start with the following theorem. Since qf mT r q f mT , Theorem C implies that Mv r Corev. We will show that Corev r Mv. By Theorem C, it is su½cient to show that for every p e q f mT with p Á mT f mT there exists q e qf mT such that p Á m q Á m. Let p e q f mT be such that p Á mT f mT . We ®rst show that for every x e Rm there exists q e qf mT such that p Á x q Á x. Let x e Rm. Then x mS for some S e . For every natural number n b 1 let S n e be such that mS n 1anmS and p Á mS n 1an p Á mS. For every n let q n e qf mT nS n . Since f is non-decreasing on R m Y q n 0 for every n. As p Á m e Corev, for every n we have 0 f 0 f mT nS n À q n Á mT 1 n q n Á mS p Á mT À p Á mS n À q n Á mT 1 n q n Á mT X Therefore 1 À 1 n q n Á mT f mT X
Since m i T b 0 for every 1 i m, and q n 0 for every n, the sequence q n y n 2 is bounded, and therefore it has a convergent subsequence which converges to a vector q e R m . It is clear that q e qf mT . We will show that p Á x q Á x. Indeed, for every n we have f mT f mT nS n q n Á mS n p Á mT nS n q n Á mS n X
As p Á mT f mT , we obtain The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem D. 
Applications
In this section we apply Theorems A and D to games which arise in economic applications. We start with the non-atomic glove market game whose core was studied in Billera and Raanan (1981) and Einy et al. (1996) . Let m 1 Y F F F Y m m be non-atomic measures in NA . The non-atomic glove market game is de®ned by vS minm 1 SY F F F Y m m S for every S e X Billera and Raanan (see Billera and Raanan (1981) , Corollary 2.7) proved that the core of v coincides with the convex hull of the set M fm i j i 1Y F F F Y m and m i T vT g. We now derive this result from Theorem D. It is We consider now a pure exchange economy E in which the commodity space is R m . The traders' space is represented by a measure space TY Y m, where T is the set of traders and m is a non-atomic probability measure on . A coalition is a member of . An assignment (of commodity bundles to traders) is an integrable function x X T 3 R m . There is a ®xed initial assignment o. (ot represents the initial bundle density of trader t). We assume that T o dm g 0. Each trader t e T has a utility function u t X R m 3 R . We ®rst study the case in which all the traders in the economy E have the same utility function u which is continuous, non-decreasing, concave and homogeneous of degree one on R m . The Aumann-Shapley-Shubik market game which is associated with the economy E (see Section 30 of Chapter VI in Aumann and Shapley (1974) Note that since the function u of Proposition 5.1 is homogeneous of degree one on R m , every p e qu T o dm is a vector of competitive prices which corresponds to a transferable utility competitive equilibrium of the economy E (see Section 32 on page 184 of Aumann and Shapley (1974) ).
We now apply Theorems A and D to the case when the economy E has a ®nite number of types.
Two traders in the economy E are of the same type if they have identical initial bundles and identical utility functions. We assume that the number of di¨erent types of traders in E is ®nite and it will be denoted by n. For every 1 i n we denote by T i the set of traders of type i. We assume that T i is measurable and mT i b 0. The utility function of the traders of type i will be denoted by u i , and their initial bundle by o i . We assume that for every 1 i n, u i is non-decreasing, concave, and continuous on R m . The Aumann-Shapley-Shubik market game (e.g., Shapley and Shubik (1969) and Aumann and Shapley (1974) ) which is associated with the economy E in the case of a ®nite number of types is implies that it is continuous on int R nm and in particular at xT , therefore (5.5) follows from Theorem A and Theorem D and the homogeneity of f .
